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Many social policies require substantial sacrifices by existing
persons in order to benefit the members of distant future generations.  
Particularly salient examples of this are the elaborate and expensive 
efforts now undertaken to prevent high-level radioactive wastes from 
polluting the biosphere, or the stringent restrictions that may be soon be 
imposed on burning fossil fuels in order to mitigate the long-term climate 
change consequences of global warming.  However, this trade-off does 
not only exist in the environmental policy area.  Many other social 
policies also call for substantial sacrifices to be made at least partly if not 
largely on behalf of distant future generations.
The existence of this trade-off presents a fundamental and difficult 
ethical question that is far too often overlooked by policy makers.  Do we 
have any ethical obligations at all to the yet-unborn members of future 
generations? Are we under a moral obligation to consider their interests, 
as best we can anticipate what those interests will be, as well as our own 
concerns in making these policy decisions?  Or are we morally free to 
choose among policies solely with regard to their consequences for 
existing persons, with no obligations to concern ourselves with their 
impacts on future generations?  In this brief essay I will try to 
demonstrate that this is a far more difficult question to answer than is 
commonly realized.  
3If we do in fact have ethical obligations to take into account the 
impacts of our policies upon future generations, then this raises the 
derivative question of how then should we balance the interests of the 
members of those future generations with the rights and interests of 
existing persons? I will try to show that this is also a much tougher 
question to answer than is generally understood.
There is a fairly broad consensus among current policy makers that 
we do have ethical obligations to future generations to take their interests 
into account in choosing our actions. One rarely if ever hears arguments 
to the contrary.  There is, of course, considerable controversy regarding 
the precise nature and scope of these obligations.  But there does appear 
to be general agreement that we do have some such moral obligations that 
we need to respect. In addition, at least in America if not elsewhere, 
there is also a broad consensus that the primary analytical framework that 
should be used for measuring and balancing the legitimate interests of 
future generations against the interests of existing persons is a cost-
benefit analysis framework.1 In this framework the impacts of a policy 
on each affected generation are measured by the yardstick of the 
willingness-to-pay of its members to enjoy or to avoid the policy’s 
consequences, and then those future impacts of the policy are 
4appropriately discounted to a smaller present value, prior to their 
aggregation with its current impacts, in making an overall assessment of 
the merits of the policy.2
I have written several related articles over the past few years in 
which I have tried to broaden the conversations now taking place 
regarding these difficult ethical and policy assessment questions in the 
environmental policy context by arguing in some detail that they cannot 
be adequately addressed without also taking into account in some fashion 
what I have called “the problem of person-altering consequences.”3 This 
important problem is unfortunately largely if not completely overlooked 
in current discussions. In this short essay I hope to generalize this 
analysis and communicate to a broader readership the nature of this 
problem, and make clear that the problem also comes up with regard to 
many other social policy decisions outside of the environmental context 
that also pose trade-offs between the impacts on existing persons and 
those affecting future generations.4
The central idea that I would like to communicate here is the 
simple yet momentous point that all social policies will inevitably have 
geometrically proliferating and eventually universal and eternal person-
altering consequences.  That fact has major implications for 
5conceptualizing the nature of our ethical obligations to future generations, 
if there in fact are any such obligations, and for balancing the interests of
future generations against those of existing persons when formulating 
policies.  
Let me begin by briefly explaining exactly what I mean by the 
phrase “person-altering consequences,” and then I will try to make clear
the dramatic and rather troubling implications such consequences present 
for determining our ethical obligations to future generations, and for the 
assessment of policies. This phrase is one that I myself have coined, but 
the underlying concept is not original to me but derives from work done 
in the late-1970’s and early-1980’s by the noted British philosopher 
Derek Parfit and some of his academic contemporaries.5 Parfit 
originally, and in my opinion somewhat inaptly, labelled his insight the 
“Non-Identity Problem,”6 and it has been later discussed by other 
philosophers under that moniker, but I have chosen to use what I think is 
the more descriptively accurate phrase “person-altering consequences”
that better communicates its core meaning.
Parfit’s insight is one of those simple yet profound insights that 
sometimes win people Nobel Prizes 30 or 40 years later after their 
significance becomes widely appreciated.  It is an idea that is pretty 
6obvious once it is explained to you.  It then seems like something that you 
have already known all along, even if you have never fully articulated it 
to yourself or to anyone else, yet it is an insight with dramatic 
implications for many fields of law.
Parfit’s insight starts with the recognition of the indisputable fact 
that the particular sperm-egg fusion that results from a successful act of 
human reproduction is an event that is radically contingent.  The outcome 
is highly sensitive to minor changes in any of a large number of factors.  
Which particular one of the hundreds of millions of sperm that are 
released in an ejaculation will unite with the female egg, if any, is a very
uncertain event.  Even the slightest change in the timing or any other 
aspect of a reproductively successful act of intercourse will almost surely 
lead to a different sperm-egg fusion, and therefore ultimately to the birth 
of a genetically different individual than would have otherwise been born.  
The person now conceived and born will be a different individual in the 
most fundamental genetic sense.  
The consequences of this simple fact are momentous.  Any social 
policy measure that is significant enough in its direct or indirect impact 
on human behaviour to lead to even a single different sperm-egg fusion 
taking place will create a genetically different individual than the person 
7that would have been born absent the implementation of the policy.  Even 
the most minor and locally-focused policy will surely have that much 
impact on someone’s behavior.  And over time, as that now genetically 
different individual is born and matures and over their life influences 
numerous other people in major or minor ways, this will result in an 
exponentially spreading cascade of individuals being conceived and born 
that are now genetically different from those persons that would 
otherwise have been conceived and born absent the policy’s initial 
impact.  This cascade of genetic alterations will lead eventually (and 
probably sooner rather than later) to the creation of an entirely different 
population of human beings for all the rest of eternity than those persons 
that would have been conceived and born absent that initial and perhaps 
very minor policy impact.  
In other words, even a quite small initial policy impact will 
ultimately lead, after a period of time probably on the order of no more 
than a few decades at the most, to the entire human population that would 
have been born and lived their lives throughout the rest of eternity from 
that point on now never even coming into existence.7 They will instead 
be replaced by a population consisting of genetically different 
individuals. Yet another way to put this is that any social policy will 
have rapidly spreading and eventually universal person-altering 
8consequences in that it will alter the fundamental genetic identities of all 
future persons.  Moreover, those person-altering consequences can be 
seen to be necessary conditions of the existence of all future persons who 
come into existence, since those persons would never have been 
conceived and born absent the policy’s implementation.  Those 
consequences make life possible for the members of future generations 
who are conceived and born, and will thus be far more significant to those 
persons than are all of the other impacts of the policy combined.
Most attempts to assess the ethical implications of policies that 
have long-term effects as well as immediate impacts, or to value in dollar 
terms the overall effects of such policies, have simply ignored these
person-altering consequences.  As a result, the conclusions that these 
efforts have reached are unfortunately irrelevant for assessing the relative 
merits of the actual choices that those policies present.   
As an example, consider for a moment the seemingly rather radical 
approach of taking all of our existing high-level radioactive wastes, on 
which we now devote literally billions of dollars/year of resources to try 
to isolate from the biological environment, and simply putting those 
wastes into ordinary, inexpensive steel barrels with perhaps 150- to 200-
year containment capabilities in a salt-water environment, and then 
9dumping them by barge somewhere into the middle of the Pacific Ocean 
and just forgetting about them.  The likely response by current world 
leaders to such a proposal would be that this would be an outrageous 
violation of our ethical obligations to consider the welfare of distant 
future generations.  Moreover, a typical cost-benefit analysis of this 
waste-dumping policy would doubtless conclude that it would result in 
such massive burdens for all distant future generations, commencing 
perhaps 200 years or so from now and continuing on for eons untold, that 
even when the benefits to existing persons of freeing those billions of 
dollars/year of resources for other uses are considered the policy’s 
impacts would still be on balance massively negative.  Such an ocean 
waste-dumping proposal would be a complete non-starter politically, I am 
sure.
The conventional framework of analysis that underlies this 
disparaging conclusion, however, implicitly involves an assessment of 
how future persons would likely feel about living in a world with a 
potentially very serious ocean radioactive waste problem, as compared to 
those same persons experiencing their lives without that radioactive waste 
problem.  But this comparison is revealed to be totally inapt, and thus 
irrelevant to the real choices at hand, once one is aware of person-altering 
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consequences.  The proper comparison of alternatives that should be 
made for ethical and policy valuation purposes is quite different.
Let me explain.  If we were to continue to spend billions of 
dollars/year on high-level radioactive waste storage, as we do now, there 
will then be one particular population of future persons conceived and 
born over time in future years.  If, however, we cheaply dump those 
radioactive wastes into the Pacific Ocean in simple steel barrels, and free 
those billions of dollars/year of resources for other uses, those new uses 
of those considerable resources will immediately trigger an exponentially 
spreading cascade of person-altering consequences.  Well before the time 
perhaps a couple of centuries from now or so when those radioactive 
toxins begin to leak into the biosphere, the entire human population alive 
then and later coming into being for the rest of eternity will owe their 
very existence to that waste-dumping policy; it will have been a 
necessary condition of their conception and birth.  They would simply 
never have been conceived and born had the ocean radioactive waste-
dumping not taken place.  In that event an entirely different group of 
persons would have come into being. 
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The proper hypothetical question to imagine posing to those future 
persons who live in the post-ocean waste dumping world, for either 
ethical assessment or policy valuation purposes, is therefore:
“Do you prefer the world that you now live in, facing as you 
do a perhaps quite serious ocean pollution problem resulting from 
our prior radioactive waste-dumping policy, to a world which is 
without such a radioactive waste problem, but which is also a 
world in which neither you nor any of the people you have ever 
known have ever come into existence?”  
In other words, the proper hypothetical question to ask is “Do you 
prefer living your life with the radioactive waste problem, or would you 
prefer non-existence?”  That Hobson’s Choice is in fact the true choice of 
alternatives that would be presented to them!  My surmise, from what I 
know of people (and supported by the statistically rather low suicide 
rates) is that virtually everyone asked this question would strongly prefer 
their existence, even with the particular and perhaps serious set of 
problems that their life posed for them, to non-existence.  If this is the 
case, then we have not actually harmed any person by dumping those 
radioactive wastes into the Pacific Ocean.
If we do dump those wastes into the ocean, then those future 
persons who are conceived and born with the radioactive waste problem 
to deal with, if they thought about it, would be grateful for what we have 
done, in a sense, because they would not otherwise exist.  On the other 
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hand, one can at least imagine the untold zillions of what one might 
loosely call “unrealised potential persons,” that is, persons who might 
have been conceived and born under other circumstances, but who as a 
result of our choices will now never actually be conceived.  But those 
wholly imaginary and non-existent unrealised potential persons of course 
have no standing to complain about the particular choices that we have 
made. My conclusion, admittedly troubling but seemingly impossible to 
avoid, is that since we probably will not harm any actual future person by 
our ocean radioactive waste-dumping actions, since they would likely all 
strongly approve of our actions so that they could come into existence, 
then under the conventional secular, consequentialist ethical premises that 
underlie most modern thinking8 we would simply not have violated any 
ethical obligations to anyone by dumping those radioactive wastes in the 
Pacific Ocean.  
More broadly, and rather disturbingly, the pervasiveness of person-
altering consequences means that any social policy that we undertake, no 
matter how radically present-oriented it is, and no matter how indifferent 
we are to its long-term consequences for future persons, is ethically self-
validating under conventional ethical criteria in that one of its 
consequences will the person-altering consequence of bringing into being 
a future population that would not want us to have acted in any other 
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way. So why not just dump those radioactive wastes into the Pacific 
Ocean and free lots of resources for the enjoyment of existing persons?  
Where does this line of thinking lead, as a practical matter?  Well, 
if one now recognizes the nature of the problem posed for conventional 
ethical assessment by person-altering consequences, but still feels at an 
intuitive level, as I do, that there must somehow be something morally
wrong with pursuing such radically present-oriented policies as my ocean 
radioactive waste-dumping hypothetical, then I would like to suggest that 
what one is actually doing, probably implicitly rather than explicitly, is 
applying a non-consequentialist ethical criterion to condemn such 
policies.  That is, one is likely applying an ethical criterion that is not
grounded upon an assessment of the policy’s consequences for the 
specific individual persons who will later come into being, but one that 
assesses the ethical merits of a policy on some basis other than those 
consequences. In addition, one is also, again probably implicitly rather 
than explicitly, applying some valuations algorithim in order to translate 
this non-consequentialist policy assessment into a rather large number in 
dollar terms before aggregating it with the conventional, financial 
measure of the policies’ consequences for existing persons, in order to 
reach such an overall negative assessment of the merits of the policy.     
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It is indeed a major step for one to leave the safe moorings of 
conventional secular, consequential ethical premises for the murky and 
uncharted waters of non-consequentialist ethical standards and policy 
valuation criteria.  One is certainly free to reject the use of conventional 
ethical standards and proceed in this other fashion, if one chooses.  But I 
would recommend that before one does so one first reflects carefully 
upon what alternative, non-consequentialist ethical premises they are 
explicitly or implicitly applying in making these assessments, and 
whether they really do accept those ethical premises as valid.  In addition, 
I would recommend that one also try to be clear about the justifications 
for the particular valuation algorithim one is are using to quantify the
non-consequentialist assessment of a policy in dollar terms before 
aggregating that assessment with the policy’s consequences for existing 
persons to reach overall conclusions.   
The problem of person-altering consequences not only dramatically 
undercuts conventional, secular ethical thinking, but also renders rather 
useless the widely-used framework of cost-benefit analysis9 that is based 
on the methodology of aggregating the willingness-to-pay of the persons 
affected by a policy to evaluate its merits.  Let me briefly explain.
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Conventional cost-benefit analysis assesses the impacts of policies 
on future generations by hypothetically positing the willingness-to-pay 
question to the same hypothetical future persons under two different 
scenarios, life with the policy impacts and life without the policy impacts, 
and then comparing the answers to evaluate the policy.10 The assumption 
is therefore made, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, that the same 
future persons will exist whether or not a policy is implemented.  This 
“same persons will exist either way” assumption is, however, clearly 
revealed to be untenable once one recognizes the existence of person-
altering consequences.  When conducting cost-benefit analyses, future 
persons’ hypothetical willingness-to-pay valuations of a policy’s impacts 
should instead be made as compared to the actual, demonstrable 
alternative of those persons’ non-existence, should that policy not be 
implemented. 
Unfortunately, if the hypothetical willingness-to-pay question was 
to be posed in this proper fashion that contrasts the actual achievable 
alternatives, any policy whatsoever would likely receive a massive (if not 
infinite) positive valuation from each of the specific future populations of 
individuals that the policy will bring into existence.11 Even if these 
valuations are then discounted quite heavily to reflect their futurity, one 
will still inevitably conclude that all policy alternatives whatsoever, 
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including the null option of taking no action of any sort which would lead
to the birth of a particular specific population of future individuals over 
time that would obviously favor that inaction, will generate massive 
future benefits.  These massive future benefits extending for all eternity 
are obviously going to be impossible to meaningfully quantify and 
compare across alternatives, and in any event the size of those future 
benefits will completely dominate and render trivial any adverse policy 
impacts upon existing persons, no matter how widespread and severe 
those current impacts might be.12 This bizarre, blanket result that all 
policy options whatsoever will generate massive net benefits of 
indeterminate size that completely dominate any adverse impacts upon 
existing persons would render any cost-benefit analyses done in this 
fashion rather useless as a practical tool for helping policy makers to 
choose among policy alternatives.             
One could perhaps attempt to try to salvage in part the cost-benefit 
framework of analysis by, again, instead first applying a non-
consequentialist ethical criterion to assess the significance of a policy for 
future generations, rather than using the normal secular, consequentialist 
willingness-to-pay framework, and then attempt to quantify into dollar 
terms in some fashion this non-consequentialist assessment before 
aggregating it with the usual willingness-to-pay based assessment of the 
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policy’s impacts on existing persons.13 But I will be the first to admit that 
I have no idea what would be the appropriate non-consequentialist ethical
criterion to apply.  
Consider again my ocean radioactive waste dumping hypothetical.  
What, exactly, is morally wrong with doing something like this that as I 
have shown will benefit virtually all if not all existing and future persons, 
by their own assessments?  Has God somewhere decreed that radically 
present-oriented policies are morally wrong, even if no existing or future 
person is thereby injured?  What evidence exists supporting this claim?  
Alternatively, should we retain a secular orientation, but now focus 
upon the nature of the intentions of the actors, rather than upon the 
inevitably beneficial consequences of their actions for future generations 
given their person-altering consequences?  But are intentions rather than 
likely results the proper ethical touchstone?  Or should we perhaps take 
the tact of ascribing existential reality and moral significance to some 
impersonal, collective generalization such as, for example, “the human 
race,” and then to try evaluate policies in terms of their beneficial or 
adverse impacts upon this collective generalization that stand apart from 
the policy’s impacts upon the specific individuals that together comprise 
that generalization?   But does the “human race” really exist apart from 
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the specific individuals that comprise it, and even if it does exist in some 
sense do we really owe ethical obligations to anyone or anything except 
specific individuals? Finally, even if we can somehow come up with a
plausible non-consequentialist ethical criterion for policy analysis, I have 
no idea of how one would then meaningfully translate such a non-
consequentialist assessment into dollar terms for aggregation with the 
policy’s consequences for existing persons, in order to reach a 
meaningful overall policy assessment.   
Let me briefly summarize my conclusions.  Once one recognizes 
the nature and ubiquity of person-altering consequences, one is 
unfortunately forced to concede that all policy alternatives whatsoever are 
ethically self-validating if one judges them by conventional secular, 
consequentialist ethical standards.  Those ethical criteria thus can no 
longer provide meaningful moral guidance as to when sacrifices by 
existing persons on behalf of distant future generations are called for, if 
ever.  This presents a real conundrum for policy makers, since there is 
little if any consensus regarding which if any of the many competing 
secular or theistic non-consequentialist ethical criteria should be applied 
to assess future policy impacts in making decisions, nor how such non-
consequentialist assessments are to be quantified into dollar terms for 
aggregation with the policy consequences for existing persons.  
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Moreover, cost-benefit analysis is now shown to be an untenable 
analytical approach, since cost-benefit analyses that ignore person-
altering consequences are clearly irrelevant to the real choices at hand, 
and such analyses that incorporate person-altering consequences in the 
usual willingness-to-pay manner will always unhelpfully conclude that all 
policy options whatsoever will generate massive net benefits of uncertain 
magnitude that will completely dominate any adverse impacts upon 
existing persons.  
So the person-altering consequences of policies indeed pose a 
significant intellectual problem, and one that I am admittedly at 
somewhat of a loss as to how to resolve.  I hope that I have made clear, 
however, that the current practice of simply ignoring person-altering 
consequences is untenable, and that we need to figure out a better way to 
address those consequences.
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